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Abstract
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses
on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of
players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules
yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of
a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation
between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional
TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
1 Introduction
1.1 Approach
Coalition formation has been a research topic of continuing interest in the area
of coalitional games. It has been analyzed from several points of view, starting
with [3], where the static situation of coalitional games in the presence of a
given coalition structure (i.e. a partition) was considered.
In this paper we consider the perennial question ‘how do coalitions form?’
by proposing a simple answer: ‘by means of merges and splits’. This brings us to
the study of a natural problem, namely under what assumptions the outcomes
of arbitrary sequences of merges and splits are unique.
These considerations yield an abstract approach to coalition formation that
focuses on partial preference relations between partitions of a group of players
and simple merge and split rules. These rules transform partitions of a group
of players under the condition that the resulting partition is preferred. By
identifying conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique
partition we are brought to a natural notion of a stable partition.
This approach is parametrized by a generic preference relation. The obtained
results depend only on a few simple properties, namely irreflexivity, transitivity
and monotonicity, and do not require any specific model of coalitional games.
In the case of coalitional TU-games the preference relations induced by var-
ious well-known orders on sequences of reals, such as leximin or Nash order,
∗Andreas Witzel is supported by a GLoRiClass fellowship funded by the European Com-
mission (Early Stage Research Training Mono-Host Fellowship MEST-CT-2005-020841).
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satisfy the required properties. As a consequence our results apply to the re-
sulting preference relations and coalitional TU-games. We also explain how our
results apply to hedonic games (games in which each player has a preference
relation on the sets of players that include him) and exchange economy games.
This approach to coalition formation is indirectly inspired by the theory of
abstract reduction systems (ARS), see, e.g. [16], one of the aims of which is
a study of conditions that guarantee a unique outcome of rule iterations. In
an earlier work [1] we exemplified another benefit of relying on ARS by using
a specific result, called Newman’s Lemma, to provide uniform proofs of or-
der independence for various strategy elimination procedures for finite strategic
games.
1.2 Related work
Because of this different starting point underpinning our approach, it is difficult
to compare it to the vast literature on the subject of coalition formation. Still, a
number of papers should be mentioned even though their results have no bearing
on ours.
In particular, rules that modify coalitions are considered in [17] in the pres-
ence of externalities and in [14] in the presence of binding agreements. In both
papers two-stage games are analyzed. In the first stage coalitions form and
in the second stage the players engage in a non-cooperative game given the
emerged coalition structure. In this context the question of stability of the
coalition structure is then analyzed.
The question of (appropriately defined) stable coalition structures often fo-
cused on hedonic games. [5] considered four forms of stability in such games:
core, Nash, individual and contractually individual stability. Each alternative
captures the idea that no player, respectively, no group of players has an in-
centive to change the existing coalition structure. The problem of existence of
(core, Nash, individually and contractually individually) stable coalitions was
considered in this and other references, for example [15] and [6].
Recently, [4] compared various notions of stability and equilibria in network
formation games. These are games in which the players may be involved in a
network relationship that, as a graph, may evolve. Other interaction structures
which players can form were considered in [7], in which formation of hierarchies
was studied, and [10], in which only bilateral agreements that follow a specific
protocol were allowed.
Early research on the subject of coalition formation is discussed in [9]. More
recently, various aspects of coalition formation are discussed in the collection
of articles [8] and in the survey [11]. Initially, we obtained the corresponding
results in [2] in a limited setting of coalitional TU-games and the preference
relation induced by the utilitarian order.
2
1.3 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set the stage by intro-
ducing an abstract comparison relation between partitions of a group of players
and the corresponding merge and split rules that act on such partitions. Then
in Section 3 we discuss a number of natural comparison relations on partitions
within the context of coalitional TU-games and in Section 4 by using arbitrary
value functions for such games.
Next, in Section 5, we introduce and study a parametrized concept of a
stable partition and in Section 6 relate it to the merge and split rules. Finally,
in Section 7 we explain how to apply the obtained results to specific coalitional
games, including TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games, and
in Section 8 we summarize our approach.
2 Comparing and transforming collections
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a fixed set of players called the grand coalition. Non-
empty subsets of N are called coalitions. A collection (in the grand coalition N)
is any family C := {C1, . . . , Cl} of mutually disjoint coalitions, and l is called
its size. If additionally
⋃l
j=1 Cj = N , the collection C is called a partition of
N . For C = {C1, . . . , Ck}, we define
⋃
C :=
⋃k
i=1 Ci.
In this article we are interested in comparing collections. In what follows we
only compare collections A and B that are partitions of the same set, i.e. such
that
⋃
A =
⋃
B. Intuitively, assuming a comparison relation B, ABB means
that the way A partitions K, where K =
⋃
A =
⋃
B, is preferable to the way
B partitions K.
To keep the presentation uniform we only assume that the relation B is
irreflexive, i.e. for no collection A, ABA holds, transitive, i.e. for all collections
A,B,C with
⋃
A =
⋃
B =
⋃
C, ABB and BBC imply ABC, and that
B is monotonic in the following two senses: for all collections A,B,C,D with⋃
A =
⋃
B,
⋃
C =
⋃
D, and
⋃
A ∩⋃C = ∅,
ABB and C BD imply A ∪ C BB ∪D, (m1)
and for all collections A,B,C with
⋃
A =
⋃
B and
⋃
A ∩⋃C = ∅,
ABB implies A ∪ C BB ∪ C. (m2)
The role of monotonicity will become clear in Section 5, though property
(m2) will be already of use in this section.
Definition 1. By a comparison relation we mean an irreflexive and transitive
relation on collections that satisfies the conditions (m1) and (m2). 
Each comparison relation B is used only to compare partitions of the same
set of players. So partitions of different sets of players are incomparable w.r.t. B,
that is no comparison relation is linear. This leads to a more restricted form of
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linearity, defined as follows. We call a comparison relation B semi-linear if for
all collections A,B with
⋃
A =
⋃
B, either ABB or BBA.
In what follows we study coalition formation by focusing on the following
two rules that allow us to transform partitions of the grand coalition:
merge: {T1, . . . , Tk} ∪ P → {
⋃k
j=1 Tj} ∪ P , where {
⋃k
j=1 Tj}B{T1, . . . , Tk}
split: {⋃kj=1 Tj} ∪ P → {T1, . . . , Tk} ∪ P , where {T1, . . . , Tk}B{⋃kj=1 Tj}
Note that both rules use the B comparison relation ‘locally’, by focusing on
the coalitions that take part and result from the merge, respectively split. In
this paper we are interested in finding conditions that guarantee that arbitrary
sequences of these two rules yield the same outcome. So, once these conditions
hold, a specific preferred partition exists such that any initial partition can be
transformed into it by applying the merge and split rules in an arbitrary order.
To start with, note that the termination of the iterations of these two rules
is guaranteed.
Note 2. Suppose that B is a comparison relation. Then every iteration of the
merge and split rules terminates.
Proof. Every iteration of these two rules produces by (m2) a sequence of par-
titions P1, P2, . . . with Pi+1BPi for all i ≥ 1. But the number of different
partitions is finite. So by transitivity and irreflexivity of B such a sequence has
to be finite.
The analysis of the conditions guaranteeing the unique outcome of the iter-
ations is now deferred to Section 6.
3 TU-games
To properly motivate the subsequent considerations and to clarify the status of
the monotonicity conditions we now introduce some natural comparison rela-
tions on collections for coalitional TU-games. A coalitional TU-game is a pair
(N, v), where N := {1, . . ., n} and v is a function from the powerset of N to the
set of non-negative reals1 such that v(∅) = 0.
For a coalitional TU-game (N, v) the comparison relations on collections
are induced in a canonic way from the corresponding comparison relations on
multisets of reals by stipulating that for the collections A and B
ABB iff v(A)B v(B), (1)
where for a collection A := {A1, . . ., Am}, v(A) := {˙v(A1), . . ., v(Am)}˙, denoting
multisets in dotted braces.
1The assumption that the values of v are non-negative is non-standard and is needed only
to accomodate for the Nash order, defined below.
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So first we introduce the appropriate relations on multisets of non-negative
reals. The corresponding definition of monotonicity for such a relation B is that
for all multisets a, b, c, d of reals
aB b and cB d imply a ∪˙ cB b ∪˙ d
and
aB b implies a ∪˙ cB b ∪˙ c,
where ∪˙ denotes multiset union.
Given two sequences (a1, . . ., am) and (b1, . . ., bn) of real numbers we define
the (extended) lexicographic order on them by putting
(a1, . . ., am) >lex (b1, . . ., bn)
iff
∃i ≤ min(m,n) (ai > bi ∧ ∀j < i aj = bj)
or
∀i ≤ min(m,n) ai = bi ∧ m > n.
Note that in this order we compare sequences of possibly different length.
We have for example (1, 1, 1, 0) >lex (1, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 0) >lex (1, 1). It is
straightforward to check that it is a linear order.
We assume below that a = {˙a1, . . ., am}˙ and b = {˙b1, . . ., bn}˙ and that a∗ is
a sequence of the elements of a in decreasing order, and define
• the utilitarian order:
a ut b iff
∑m
i=1 ai >
∑n
j=1 bj ,
• the Nash order:
a Nash b iff
∏m
i=1 ai >
∏n
j=1 bj ,
• the leximin order:
a lex b iff a∗ >lex b∗.
In [12] these relations were considered for sequences of the same length. For
such sequences we shall discuss in Section 4 two other natural orders. The
intuition behind the Nash order is that when the sum
∑m
i=1 ai is fixed, the
product
∏m
i=1 ai is largest when all ais are equal. So in a sense the Nash order
favours an equal distribution.
The above relations are clearly irreflexive and transitive. Additionally the
following holds.
Note 3. The above three relations are all monotonic both in sense (m1)
and (m2).
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Proof. The only relation for which the claim is not immediate is lex. We only
prove (m1) for lex; the remaining proof is analogous.
Let arbitrary multisets of non-negative reals a, b, c, d be given. We define,
with e denoting any sequence or multiset of non-negative reals,
len(e) := the number of elements in e,
µ := (a ∪˙ b ∪˙ c ∪˙ d)∗ with all duplicates removed,
ν(x, e) := the number of occurrences of x in e,
β := 1 +
len(µ)
max
k=1
{ν(µk, a ∪˙ b ∪˙ c ∪˙ d)},
#(e) :=
len(µ)∑
k=1
ν(µk, e) · β−k.
So µ is the sequence of all distinct reals used in a ∪˙ b ∪˙ c ∪˙ d, arranged in
a decreasing order. The function #(·) injectively maps a multiset e to a real
number y in such a way that in the floating point representation of y with base
β, the kth digit after the point equals the number of occurrences of the kth
biggest number µk in e. The base β is chosen in such a way that even if e is the
union of some of the given multisets, the number ν(x, e) of occurrences of x in
e never exceeds β − 1. Therefore, the following sequence of implications holds:
a∗ >lex b∗ and c∗ >lex d∗ ⇒ #(a) > #(b) and #(c) > #(d)
⇒ #(a) + #(c) > #(b) + #(d)
⇒ #(a ∪˙ c) > #(b ∪˙ d)
⇒ (a ∪˙ c)∗ >lex (b ∪˙ d)∗
Consequently, the corresponding three relations on collections induced by
(1) are all semi-linear comparison relations.
As a natural example of an irreflexive and transitive relation on multisets of
reals that does not satisfy the monotonicity condition (m1) consider av defined
by
a av b iff (
∑m
i=1 ai)/m > (
∑n
j=1 bj)/n.
Note that for
a := {˙3}˙, b := {˙2, 2, 2, 2}˙, c := {˙1, 1, 1, 1}˙, d := {˙0}˙
we have both a av b and c av d but not a ∪˙ c av b ∪˙ d since {˙3, 1, 1, 1, 1}˙ av
{˙2, 2, 2, 2, 0}˙ does not hold.
Further, the following natural irreflexive and transitive relations on multisets
of reals do not satisfy the monotonicity condition (m2):
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• the elitist order:
a el b iff max(a) > max(b),
• the egalitarian order:
a eg b iff min(a) > min(b),
Indeed, we have both {˙2}˙ el {˙1}˙ and {˙2}˙ eg {˙1}˙, but neither {˙3, 2}˙ el
{˙3, 2}˙ nor {˙1, 0}˙ eg {˙1, 0}˙ holds.
4 Individual values
In the previous section we defined the comparison relations in the context of TU-
games by comparing the values (yielded by the v function) of whole coalitions.
Alternatively, we could compare payoffs to individual players. The idea is that
in the end, the value secured by a coalition may have to be distributed to its
members, and this final payoff to a player may determine his preferences.
To formalize this approach we need the notion of an individual value function
φ that, given the v function of a TU-game and a coalition A, assigns to each
player i ∈ A a real value φvi (A). We assume that φ is efficient, i.e. that it exactly
distributes the coalition’s value to its members:∑
i∈A
φvi (A) = v(A).
For a collection C := {C1, . . . , Ck}, we put
φv(C) := {˙φvi (A) | A ∈ C, i ∈ A}˙.
Given two collections C = {C1, . . . , Ck} and C ′ = {C ′1, . . . , C ′l} with⋃
C =
⋃
C ′, the comparison relations now compare φv(C) and φv(C ′), which
are multisets of |⋃C| real numbers, one number for each player. In this way
it is guaranteed that the comparison relations are anonymous in the sense that
the names of the players do not play a role.
In this section, to distinguish between comparison relations defined only by
means of v and those defined using both v and φ, we denote the former by Bv
and the latter by Bφ.
We now examine how these two different approaches for defining comparison
relations relate. To this end, we will clarify when they coincide, i.e. when given
a comparison relation defined in one way, we can also obtain it using the other
way, and when they are unrelated. We begin by formalizing the concept of
anonymity.
Definition 4. Assume a coalitional TU-game (N, v).
• An individual value function φ is anonymous if for all v, permutations pi
of N , i ∈ N , and A ⊆ N
φvi (A) = φ
v◦pi−1
pi(i) (pi(A)).
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• v is anonymous if for all permutations pi of N and A ⊆ N
v(A) = v(pi(A)).
Note that for all A we have (v ◦ pi−1)(pi(A)) = v(A). Intuitively, φ is anony-
mous if it does not depend on the names of the players and v is anonymous if
it is defined only in terms of the cardinality of the argument coalition.
The following simple observation holds.
Note 5. For any v and φ, if Bv and Bφ are the utilitarian order (as defined
in Section 3), then for all collections C and C ′, we have φv(C)Bφ φv(C ′) iff
v(C)Bv v(C ′).
Proof. Immediate since∑
A∈C
v(A) =
∑
A∈C
∑
i∈A
φvi (A) =
∑
A∈C,i∈A
φvi (A).
For other orders discussed in Section 3 no relation between Bv and Bφ holds.
In fact, we have the following results.
Theorem 6. Given v and Bv, it is in general not possible to define an anony-
mous individual value function φ along with Bφ such that for all collections
C and C ′, we have φv(C)Bφ φv(C ′) iff v(C)Bv v(C ′). This holds even if we
restrict ourselves to anonymous v.
Proof. Consider the following game with N = {1, 2}:
v({1}) := 1 v({2}) := 1 v({1, 2}) := 2,
and take Bv to be the Nash order as defined in Section 3. This yields both
v({{1, 2}}) = {˙2}˙Bv {˙1, 1}˙ = v({{1}, {2}})
and
v({{1}, {2}}) 6Bv v({{1, 2}}).
However, the symmetry of the game and anonymity of φ forces
φv({{1, 2}}) = {˙1, 1}˙ = φv({{1}, {2}}),
so we have either
φv({{1, 2}})Bφ φv({{1}, {2}}) and φv({{1}, {2}})Bφ φv({{1, 2}})
or
φv({{1, 2}}) 6Bφ φv({{1}, {2}}) and φv({{1}, {2}}) 6Bφ φv({{1, 2}}).
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Theorem 7. Given v, φ and Bφ, it is in general not possible to define Bv such
that for all collections C and C ′, we have v(C)Bv v(C ′) iff φv(C)Bφ φv(C ′).
This holds even if we restrict ourselves to anonymous v, anonymous φ, and a
Nash or leximin order (as defined in Section 3) for Bφ.
Proof. Consider N = {1, . . . , 4} and
v(A) := 6 for all A ⊆ N
φvi (A) :=
v(A)
|A| .
Then we have
φv({{1}, {2, 3, 4}}) = {˙6, 2, 2, 2}˙
φv({{1, 2}, {3, 4}}) = {˙3, 3, 3, 3}˙,
which are distinguished by each of the mentioned Bφ, while
v({{1}, {2, 3, 4}}) = v({{1, 2}, {3, 4}}) = {˙6, 6}˙.
These results suggest that the two approaches for defining preference rela-
tions are fundamentally different and coincide only for the utilitarian order.
In the case of individual values we can introduce natural orders that have no
counterpart for the comparison relations defined only by means of v. The reason
is that for each partition P , φv(P ) can be alternatively viewed as a sequence (of
payoffs) of (the same) length n. Such sequences can then be compared using
• the majority order :
(k1, . . ., kn) m (l1, . . ., ln) iff |{i | ki > li}| > |{i | li > ki}|,
• the Pareto order :
(k1, . . ., kn) p (l1, . . ., ln) iff
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ki ≥ li and ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ki > li.
The relation m is clearly irreflexive and monotonic both in sense (m1)
and (m2). Unfortunately, it is not transitive. Indeed, we have both (2, 3, 0) m
(1, 2, 2) and (1, 2, 2) m (3, 1, 1), but (2, 3, 0) m (3, 1, 1) does not hold. In
contrast, the relation p is transitive, irreflexive, monotonic both in sense (m1)
and (m2).
5 Stable partitions
We now return to our analysis of partitions. One way to identify conditions
guaranteeing the unique outcome of the iterations of the merge and split rules
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is through focusing on the properties of such a unique outcome. This brings us
to the concept of a stable partition.
We follow here the approach of [2], although now no notion of a game is
present. The introduced notion is parametrized by means of a defection function
D that assigns to each partition some partitioned subsets of the grand coalition.
Intuitively, given a partition P the family D(P ) consists of all the collections
C := {C1, . . . , Cl} whose players can leave the partition P by forming a new,
separate, group of players ∪lj=1Cj divided according to the collection C. Two
most natural defection functions are Dp, which allows formation of all partitions
of the grand coalition, and Dc, which allows formation of all collections in the
grand coalition.
Next, given a collection C and a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} we define
C[P ] := {P1 ∩
⋃
C, . . . , Pk ∩
⋃
C} \ {∅}
and call C[P ] the collection C in the frame of P . (By removing the empty set
we ensure that C[P ] is a collection.) To clarify this concept consider Figure 1.
We depict in it a collection C, a partition P and C in the frame of P (together
with P ). Here C consists of four coalitions, while C in the frame of P consists
of three coalitions.
Collection C
Partition P
C[P ]
Figure 1: A collection C in the frame of a partition P
Intuitively, given a subset S of N and a partition C := {C1, . . . , Cl} of S, the
collection C offers the players from S the ‘benefits’ resulting from the partition
of S by C. However, if a partition P of N is ‘in force’, then the players from
S enjoy instead the benefits resulting from the partition of S by C[P ], i.e. C in
the frame of P .
To get familiar with the C[P ] notation note that
• if C is a singleton, say C = {T}, then {T}[P ] = {P1∩T, . . ., Pk ∩T}\{∅},
where P = {P1, . . ., Pk},
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• if C is a partition of N , then C[P ] = P ,
• if C ⊆ P , that is C consists of some coalitions of P , then C[P ] = C.
In general the following simple observation holds.
Note 8. For a collection C and a partition P , C[P ] = C iff each element of C
is a subset of a different element of P . 
This brings us to the following notion.
Definition 9. Assume a defection function D and a comparison relation B. We
call a partition P D-stable if C[P ]BC for all C ∈ D(P ) such that C[P ] 6= C.
The last qualification, that is C[P ] 6= C, requires some explanation. Intu-
itively, this condition indicates that the players only care about the way they are
partitioned. Indeed, if C[P ] = C, then the partitions of
⋃
C by means of P and
by means of C coincide and are viewed as equally satisfactory for the players
in
⋃
C. By disregarding the situations in which C[P ] = C we therefore adopt
a limited viewpoint of cooperation according to which the players in C do not
care about the presence of the players from outside of
⋃
C in their coalitions.
The following observation holds, where we call a partition P of N B-maximal
if for all partitions P ′ of N different from P , P BP ′ holds.
Theorem 10. A partition of N is Dp-stable iff it is B-maximal.
In particular, a Dp-stable partition of N exists if B is a semi-linear compar-
ison relation. 
Proof. Note that if C is a partition of N , then C[P ] 6= C is equivalent to the
statement P 6= C, since then C[P ] = P . So a partition P of N is Dp-stable iff
for all partitions P ′ 6= P of N , P BP ′ holds.
In contrast, Dc-stable partitions do not need to exist even if the comparison
relation B is semi-linear.
Example 11. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and any semi-linear comparison relation
B such that {{1, 2, 3}}B{{1}, {2}, {3}} and {{a}, {b}}B{{a, b}} for all a, b ∈
{1, 2, 3}, a 6= b.
Then no partition of N is Dc-stable. Indeed, P := {{1}, {2}, {3}} is not Dc-
stable since for C := {{1, 2, 3}} we have C[P ] = {{1}, {2}, {3}} 6B{{1, 2, 3}} =
C. Further, any other partition P contains some coalition {a, b} and is thus not
Dc-stable either since then for C := {{a}, {b}} we have
C[P ] = {{a, b}} 6B{{a}, {b}} = C.

In [2] another example is given for the case of TU-games and utilitarian
order. More precisely, a TU-game is defined in which no Dc-stable partition
exists, where B is defined through (1) using the utilitarian order ut.
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6 Stable partitions and merge/split rules
We now resume our investigation of the conditions under which every iteration
of the merge and split rules yields the same outcome. To establish the main
theorem of the paper and provide an answer in terms of the Dc-stable partitions,
we first present the following three lemmata about Dc-stable partitions.
Lemma 12. Every Dc-stable partition is closed under the applications of the
merge and split rules.
Proof. To prove the closure of a Dc-stable partition P under the merge rule
assume that for some {T1, . . . , Tk} ⊆ P we have {
⋃k
j=1 Tj}B{T1, . . . , Tk}. Dc-
stability of P with C := {⋃kj=1 Tj} yields
{T1, . . . , Tk} = {
k⋃
j=1
Tj}[P ]B{
k⋃
j=1
Tj},
which is a contradiction by virtue of the transitivity and irreflexivity of B.
The closure under the split rule is shown analogously.
Next, we provide a characterization of Dc-stable partitions. Given a partition
P := {P1, . . . , Pk} we call here a coalition T P -compatible if for some i ∈
{1, . . . , k} we have T ⊆ Pi and P -incompatible otherwise.
Lemma 13. A partition P = {P1, . . . , Pk} of N is Dc-stable iff the following
two conditions are satisfied (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the following
coalitions):
(i) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each pair of disjoint coalitions A and B such
that A ∪B ⊆ Pi
{A ∪B}B{A,B}, (2)
(ii) for each P -incompatible coalition T ⊆ N
{T}[P ]B{T}. (3)
A
B
T
Partition P
Figure 2: P -compatible coalitions A and B and a P -incompatible coalition T
as in Lemma 13
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Proof. (⇒) It suffices to note that for C = {A,B} we have C[P ] = {A ∪ B}
and for C = {T} we have {T}[P ] 6= {T} by the P -incompatibility of T . Then
(i) and (ii) follow directly by the definition of Dc-stability.
(⇐) Transitivity, monotonicity (m2) and (2) imply by induction that for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each collection C = {C1, . . . , Cl} with l > 1 and
⋃
C ⊆ Pi,{⋃
C
}
BC. (4)
Let now C be an arbitrary collection in N such that C[P ] 6= C. We prove
that C[P ]BC. Define
Di := {T ∈ C | T ⊆ Pi},
E := C \⋃ki=1Di,
Ei := {Pi ∩ T | T ∈ E} \ {∅}.
Note that Di is the set of P -compatible elements of C contained in Pi, E
is the set of P -incompatible elements of C and Ei consists of the non-empty
intersections of P -incompatible elements of C with Pi.
Suppose now that
⋃k
i=1E
i 6= ∅. Then E 6= ∅ and consequently
k⋃
i=1
Ei =
k⋃
i=1
({Pi ∩ T | T ∈ E} \ {∅}) =
⋃
T∈E
({T}[P ]) (m1),(3)B E. (5)
Consider now the following property:
|Di ∪ Ei| > 1. (6)
Fix i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If (6) holds, then{
Pi ∩
⋃
C
}
=
{⋃
(Di ∪ Ei)
} (4)
BDi ∪ Ei
and otherwise {
Pi ∩
⋃
C
}
=
{
Di ∪ Ei} .
Recall now that
C[P ] =
k⋃
i=1
{
Pi ∩
⋃
C
}
\ {∅}.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. (6) holds for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Then by (m1) and (m2)
C[P ]B
k⋃
i=1
(Di ∪ Ei) = (C \ E) ∪
k⋃
i=1
Ei.
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If
⋃k
i=1E
i = ∅, then also E = ∅ and we get C[P ]BC. Otherwise by (5),
transitivity and (m2)
C[P ]B(C \ E) ∪ E = C.
Case 2. (6) does not hold for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Then
C[P ] =
k⋃
i=1
(Di ∪ Ei) = (C \ E) ∪
k⋃
i=1
Ei.
Moreover, because C[P ] 6= C, by Note 8 a P -incompatible element in C exists.
So
⋃k
i=1E
i 6= ∅ and by (5) and (m2) we get as before
C[P ]B(C \ E) ∪ E = C.
In [2] the above characterization was proved for the coalitional TU-games
and the utilitarian order. We shall now use it in the proof of the following
lemma.
Lemma 14. Assume that P is Dc-stable. Let P ′ be closed under applications
of merge and split rules. Then P ′ = P .
Proof. Suppose P = {P1, . . . , Pk}, P ′ = {T1, . . . , Tm}. Assume P 6= P ′. Then
there is i0 ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have Pi0 6= Tj . Let
Tj1 , . . . , Tjl be the minimum cover of Pi0 . In the following case distinction we
use Lemma 13.
Case 1. Pi0 =
⋃l
h=1 Tjh .
Then {Tj1 , . . . , Tjl} is a proper partition of Pi0 . But (2) (through its gener-
alization to (4)) yields Pi0 B{Tj1 , . . . , Tjl}, thus the merge rule is applicable to
P ′.
Case 2. Pi0 (
⋃l
h=1 Tjh .
Then for some jh we have ∅ 6= Pi0 ∩Tjh ( Tjh , so Tjh is P -incompatible. By
(3) we have {Tjh}[P ]B{Tjh}, thus the split rule is applicable to P ′.
We can now present the desired result.
Theorem 15. Suppose that B is a comparison relation and P is a Dc-stable
partition. Then
(i) P is the outcome of every iteration of the merge and split rules.
(ii) P is a unique Dp-stable partition.
(iii) P is a unique Dc-stable partition.
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Proof. (i) By Note 2 every iteration of the merge and split rules terminates, so
the claim follows by Lemma 14.
(ii) Since P is Dc-stable, it is in particular Dp-stable. By Theorem 10 for all
partitions P ′ 6= P , P BP ′ holds. So uniqueness follows from the transitivity
and irreflexivity of B.
(iii) Suppose that P ′ is a Dc-stable partition. By Lemma 12 P ′ is closed under
the applications of the merge and split rules, so by Lemma 14 P ′ = P .
This theorem generalizes [2], where this result was established for the coali-
tional TU-games and the utilitarian order. It was also shown there that there
exist coalitional TU-games in which all iterations of the merge and split rules
have a unique outcome which is not a Dc-stable partition.
7 Applications
The obtained results do not involve any notion of a game. In this section we
show applications to three classes of coalitional games. In each case we define a
class of games and a natural comparison relation for which all iterations of the
merge and split rules have a unique outcome.
7.1 Coalitional TU-games
To show that the obtained results naturally apply to coalitional TU-games
consider first the special case of the utilitarian order, according to which
given a coalitional TU-game (N, v), for two collections P := {P1, . . ., Pk} and
Q = {Q1, . . ., Ql} such that
⋃
P =
⋃
Q, we have
P BQ iff
∑k
i=1 v(Pi) >
∑l
i=1 v(Qi).
Recall that (N, v) is called strictly superadditive if for each pair of disjoint
coalitions A and B
v(A) + v(B) < v(A ∪B).
Further, recall from [13, page 241] that given a partition P := {P1, . . ., Pk} of
N and coalitional TU-games (P1, v1), . . ., (Pk, vk), their composition (N,⊕ki=1vi)
is defined by
(⊕ki=1vi)(A) =
k∑
i=1
vi(Pi ∩A).
We now modify this definition and introduce the concept of a semi-union of
(P1, v1), . . ., (Pk, vk), written as (N,⊕ki=1vi), and defined by
(⊕ki=1vi)(A) :=
{
(⊕ki=1vi)(A) if A⊆ Pi for some i
(⊕ki=1vi)(A)−  otherwise
where  > 0.
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So for P -incompatible coalitions the payoff is strictly smaller for the semi-
union of TU-games than for their union, while for other coalitions the payoffs
are the same. It is then easy to prove using Lemma 13 that in the semi-union
(N,⊕ki=1vi) of strictly superadditive TU-games the partition P is Dc-stable.
Consequently, by Theorem 15, in this game P is the outcome of every iteration
of the merge and split rules.
The following more general example deals with arbitrary monotonic com-
parison relations as introduced in Sections 3 and 4.
Example 16. Given a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N , with B being one of
the orders defined in Section 3, we define a TU-game for which P is the outcome
of every iteration of the merge and split rules.
Let
f(x, y) :=

x+ y if B is the utilitarian order
x · y if B is the Nash order
max{x, y} if B is the leximin order
and define
v(A) :=

1 if |A| = 1
max
B∪C=A
B,C disjoint
coalitions
{f(v(B), v(C))}+ 1 if |A| > 1 and A ⊆ Pi for some i
0 otherwise.
Then
(i) for any two disjoint coalitions A,B with A ∪B ⊆ Pi for some i, we have
v(A ∪B) > f(v(A), v(B))
by construction of v, and thus
• v(A ∪B) > v(A) + v(B) for utilitarian B;
• v(A ∪B) > v(A) · v(B) for Nash B;
• v(A ∪B) > max{v(A), v(B)} for leximin B.
Hence in all cases {A ∪B}B{A,B}.
(ii) for any P -incompatible coalition T ⊆ N , we have
v(A) > 0 for all A ∈ {T}[P ], and v(T ) = 0.
Hence {T}[P ]B{T}.
Lemma 13 now implies that P is indeed Dc-stable, so Theorem 15 applies. 
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Example 17. Given a partition P := {P1, . . . , Pk} of N , with B being one of
the orders defined in Section 3 or Pareto order of Section 4, we define a TU-game
and an individual value function for which P is the outcome of every iteration
of the merge and split rules.
Let
f(x, y) :=
{
|N | ·max{x, y}+ 1 if B is leximin or Pareto
x+ y otherwise,
define v as in Example 16, and define
φvi (A) :=
v(A)
|A| .
Then
(i) for any two disjoint coalitions A,B with A ∪B ⊆ Pi for some i, we have
v(A ∪B) > f(v(A), v(B))
again by construction of v, and thus
• for utilitarian or Nash B:
v(A ∪ B) > v(A) + v(B), and since φvi distributes the value evenly,
in all cases {A ∪B}B{A,B},
• for leximin or Pareto B:
v(A ∪B) > |A ∪B| ·max{v(A), v(B)},
thus φvi (A ∪B) > max{v(A), v(B)} for all i,
thus {A ∪B}B{A,B} in all cases,
(ii) for any P -incompatible coalition T ⊆ N , {T}[P ]B{T} as before.
Again, Lemma 13 implies that P is Dc-stable, and Theorem 15 applies. 
7.2 Hedonic games
Recall that a hedonic game (N,1, . . .,n) consists of a set of players N =
{1, . . ., n} and a sequence of linear preorders 1, . . .,n, where each i is the
preference of player i over the subsets of N containing i. In what follows we
shall not need the assumption that the i relations are linear. Denote by i
the associated irreflexive relation.
Given a partition P of N and player i we denote by P (i) the element of P
to which i belongs and call it the set of friends of i in P .
We now provide an example of a hedonic game in which a Dc-stable partition
w.r.t. to a natural comparison relation  exists.
To this end we assume that, given a partition P := {P1, . . ., Pk} of N , each
player
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• prefers a larger set of his friends in P over a smaller one,
• ‘dislikes’ coalitions that include a player who is not his friend in P .
We formalize this by putting for all sets of players that include i
S i T iff T ⊆ S ⊆ P (i),
and by extending this order to the coalitions that include player i and possibly
players from outside of P (i) by assuming that such coalitions are the minimal
elements in i. So
S i T iff either T ( S ⊆ P (i) or S ⊆ P (i) and not T ⊆ P (i).
We then define for two partitions Q and Q′ of the same set of players
QBQ′ iff for i ∈ {1, . . ., n} Q(i) i Q′(i) with at least one i being strict.
(Note the similarity between this relation and the p relation introduced in
Section 4.) It is straightforward to check that B is indeed a comparison relation
and that the partition P satisfies then conditions (2) and (3) of Lemma 13.
So by virtue of this lemma P is Dc-stable. Consequently, on the account of
Theorem 15, the partition P is the outcome of every iteration of the merge and
split rules.
7.3 Exchange economy games
Recall that an exchange economy consists of
• a market with k goods,
• for each player i an initial endowment of these goods represented by a
vector ~ωi ∈ Rk+,
• for each player i a transitive and linear relation i using which he can
compare the bundles of the goods, represented as vectors from Rk+.
An exchange economy game is then defined by first taking as the set of
outcomes the set of all sequences of bundles,
X := {(~x1, . . ., ~xn) | ~xi ∈ Rk+ for i ∈ N},
i.e. X = (Rk+)n, and extending each preference relation i from the set Rk+ of
all bundles to the set X by putting for ~x, ~y ∈ X
~x i ~y iff ~xi i ~yi. (7)
This simply means that each player is only interested in his own bundle.
Then we assign to each coalition S the following set of outcomes:
V (S) := {~x ∈ X |∑i∈S ~xi = ∑i∈S ~ωi and ~xj = ~ωj for all j ∈ N \ S}.
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So V (S) consists of the set of outcomes that can be achieved by trading between
the members of S.
Given a partition P = {P1, . . . , Pk} of N = {1, . . . , n} we now define a
specific exchange economy game with n goods (one type of good for each player)
as follows, where i ∈ N :
~ωi := characteristic vector of P (i),
~xi i ~yi iff xi,i ≥ yi,i and ~xi i ~yi iff xi,i > yi,i,
that is, each player’s initial endowment consists of exactly one good of the type
of each of his friends in P , and he prefers a bundle if he gets more goods of his
own type.
Now let ABB iff
∀Al ∈ A \B ∃~x ∈ V (Al) ∀j ∈ Al[(∀~y ∈ V (B(j))~x j ~y) ∨ (∀~y ∈ V (B(j))~x j ~y ∧ |Al| < |B(j)|)] .
So a partition A is preferred to a partition B if each coalition Al of A not
present in the partition B can achieve an outcome which each player of Al
strictly prefers to any outcome of his respective coalition in B, or which he likes
at least as much as any outcome of his respective coalition in B when that coali-
tion is strictly larger than Al. The intuition is that the players’ preferences over
outcomes weigh most, but in case of ties the players prefer smaller coalitions.
It is easy to check that B is a comparison relation. We now prove that the
partition P is Dc-stable w.r.t. B. First, note that by the definition of the initial
endowments for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k} and coalitions A ⊆ Pl there is an outcome
~zA ∈ V (A) which gives exactly |A| units of good j to each player j ∈ A. We
have ~zA i ~x for all i ∈ A and ~x ∈ V (A). This implies that P is Dc-stable by
Lemma 13 since
(i) for each pair of disjoint coalitions A and B such that A ∪ B ⊆ Pl we
have ~zA∪B i ~zA for each i ∈ A and ~zA∪B i ~zB for each i ∈ B since
|A ∪B| > |A| and |A ∪B| > |B|, thus {A ∪B}B{A,B},
(ii) for any P -incompatible T ⊆ N , A ∈ {T}[P ], i ∈ A, and ~x ∈ V (T ), we
have ~zA i ~x (since player i can get in T at most all goods of his type
from his friends in P , which are exactly the same as in A), and |A| < |T |,
thus {T}[P ]B{T}.
Consequently, in the above game, by Theorem 15 the partition {P1, . . ., Pk}
is the outcome of every iteration of the merge and split rules.
8 Conclusions
We have presented a generic approach to coalition formation, in which the only
possible operations on coalitions are merges and splits. These operations can
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take place when they result in an improvement with respect to some given com-
parison relation on partitions of the involved subset of players. Such a compar-
ison relation needs to satisfy only a few natural properties, namely irreflexivity,
transitivity and monotonicity, and we have given examples induced by several
well-known orders in the context of TU-games.
We have identified natural conditions under which every iteration of merges
and splits yields a unique outcome, which led to a natural notion of a stable
partition. We have shown that besides TU-games our approach and results also
naturally apply to hedonic games and exchange economy games.
It would be interesting to extend this approach and allow other transforma-
tions, such as transfers (moving a subset of one coalition to another) or, more
generally, swaps (exchanging subsets of two coalitions), as considered in [2] in
the setting of TU-games and utilitarian order.
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